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Religious Values, Political Action,
and Civic Discourse
ROBERT AUDI"
INTRODUCTION

Most of the recent explorations of the relation between religion and politics in
liberal democracy address what might be called structural questions. These chiefly
concern the kinds of laws, institutions, and public policies and practices appropriate
to such a society. What, for instance, are the rights of religious citizens in seeking
to shape their society according to their religious ideals? What basis of decision is
appropriate for government officials whose religious commitments bear on their
professional judgments? Finally, what is the place of religions considerations in
public discourse, whether on the part of voters discussing candidates, candidates
running for office, journalists reporting on politics, or simply citizens talking
publicly about their community's problems?
Within the broad area of political philosophy, structural questions like these can
be approached from at least two perspectives, that of the rights of the parties
involved and that of the ethical standards left open by these rights, the standards
governing how we should use the freedom we may exercise without violating
anyone's rights. Given legal acknowledgment and legal protection of a moral right
of free religious exercise, there remain ethical questions about how best to exercise
this right, say in relation to what child-rearing practices to endorse or institute. The
rights perspective is crucial for determining the limits ofpermissible conduct, but a
different kind of ethical standard, applicable within those limits, is crucial for
making good choices among the permissible options. Such matters as child-rearing
practices and questions about the appropriate roles of men and women in religious
rituals, as directed toward institutional religion, are examples of what I am calling
structural. They concern patterns of conduct to be held up for individual realization,
and they may be (and often are) answered at the level of church policy or in some
other institutional setting. The contrast between a rights perspective and a wider
ethical perspective that bears on decisions within the territoryleft openby rights also
applies to individual questions, specifically to questions of the ethical standards
appropriate for the conduct of individual citizens acting as such. For instance, how,
if at all, should I use religions language in arguing for public programs to preserve
the natural environment? Both kinds of questions, structural and individual, concern
me, but I give more attention to the latter, which still seem to need more attention

* Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Nebraska,
Lincoln. This paper was prepared for the Symposium: Religious Liberty at the Dawn ofaNew
Millenium held at Indiana University in April, 1999 and in places overlaps several
subsections ofmy RELIGIOUS COMMrMENTAND SECULARREAsON (forthcoming 2000). Ihave
benefitted much from discussions with otherparticipants, as well as from vigorous discussions
of earlier drafts at Biola University, the University of New Mexico, and the 1998 Midwestern
Regional meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers. For detailed responses to several
points I thank Douglas Geivett, James Gustafson, Charles Larmore, Michael Perry, and
Nicholas Wolterstorff.
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both in the theory of democracy and for the purpose of contributing to civic harmony
in liberal democracies.
I begin by sketching a contrast between a morality of rights and a morality of
virtue. From the point of view of the morality of rights, a sound liberal political
philosophy must affirm extensive freedom of expression for ordinary citizens. It must
also permit them to choose the basis on which they support laws, public policies, and
candidates for office. Public officials are by and large less free than ordinary citizens
on both counts, at least from the point of view of their moral responsibilities; they
are more constrained both in their expression oftheir views and in their choice of an
appropriate basis for forming thoseviews. Judges, for instance, may not discriminate
on certain kinds of grounds that might be a penissible basis of preference for a
citizen selecting a school board member; and in general legislators may not, in their
official capacities, use language that favors the interests of any particular religion.
A working democracy may or may not legally enforce such non-discrimination
standards in the use of language, but my concern is with political and moral matters,
which I regard as the main basis, though by no means the only basis, for determining
good law in the first place.
In this large territory where both the law and the morality of rights leave one free
to exercise discretion, a morality of virtue becomes highly relevant. For in this
ethical domain, moral probity often requires us to do more than we must do simply
to remain within our rights and avoid violating the rights of others. In a word, it
requires virtue. Virtue may call on us to do some things, such as support charities,
that we have a right not to do. It also bears on what it is best to do in exercising our
rights. Civic virtue is the kind appropriate to citizens as such and is the dimension
of virtue I have in mind in discussing the ethics of citizenship in liberal
democracies.'
If we ask what civic virtue requires of citizens in a free democracy, we find that
in very general terms it calls on all of them, the religious and the nonreligious alike,
to conduct their common lives with mutual respect. In previous work I have defended
principles intended to articulate some of the specific commitments of civic virtue,
particularly for religious citizens in a free democracy. These principles focus mainly
on the kinds of reasons appropriate for justifying coercive laws and public policies;
they leave a great deal open concerning the appropriate content and style of public
discourse. This is an area where the foundational framework that supports those
principles has yet to be adequately brought to bear, particularly with respect to the
question of how religious citizens-and here I shall be thinking mainly of
monotheistic religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-may best bring
their religious perspective into their public discourse.
This is not mainly a structural question. It is not, for instance, a question of what
laws we should have or what political structures should be established. It is a
question of civic virtue and political prudence. The standards that operate in these
domains will be relevant in any political structure, but they cannot be dictated by
structural standards alone or fully specified by any body of law. The question of the
kind of role religion should have in public discourse in a free democracy may,

1. See generallyRobert Audi, A Liberal Theory of Civic Virtue, 15 Soc. PHIL. &POL'Y
149 (1997). This paper offers an account of what constitutes civic virtue.
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however, be equally urgent. Writing in a recent law review article, an Arkansas
Court of Appeals judge maintains that "the prevailing aversion to any influential role
that religious values might play injudicial decision-making does a disservice to the
deliberative processes thatjudges employ and deprives society of the benefit that may
be obtained from an open and uninhibited debate of various sources of moral
knowledge."2 And in a recent panel discussion at the annual meeting of the
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, a Christian professor of law
emphatically related his sense that liberal intimidation about appealing to religion
had restrained him even in his discussion with his own son about what the United
States might properly do regarding Saddam Hussein's defiance of restrictions
imposed on Iraq by the United Nations.3
My aim here is to address some questions about the appropriate content for public
discourse in a way that contributes toward a civic harmony in which all elements,
particularly religious citizens, can play a maximally constructive role in securing the
vitality of a free democracy. Part I begins with a short summary of some of the main
standards of civic virtue that I consider essential. Part I also articulates some
contemporary concerns about an oppressive liberal consensus commonly felt to exist
in many quarters in liberal democracies. Part II identifies some categories ofpublic
discourse and explores standards for determining an appropriate use of religious
elements within it. On the basis of the results of Part I, Part I addresses
sociopolitical discourse. The final Part takes up some ofthe wider dimensions ofthe
question of the special role of religion in liberal democratic societies.
I. SOME

STANDARDS OF CIVIC VIRTUE

The most plausible kinds of groundings of liberal democracy-for instance,
Kantian or contractarian or eclectic ethical strategies for justifying it-will support
ideals of citizenship that imply a measure of separation of church and state and,

2. Wendell L. Griffen, The CaseforReligiousValues in JudicialDecision-Making,81
MARQ. L. Rv.513, 514 (1998). However he also says that

[t]he devout judge who relies on religious convictions as the sole basis for
judicial decision is acting as a prelate, not a jurist. The judge whose notion of
justice includes a sensitivity for the interplay ofreligious and other values in the
decision-making process is reasoning judicially, even when including religious
values in the reasoning.
Id. at 520. For a valuable critical discussion, see Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path ofAmerican
Liberty: Fromthe OriginalTheology to FormalNeutralityand an UncertainFuture,75 IND.
L.J. 1 (2000); Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decision of
ConstitutionalProtection,75 IND. L.J. 219 (2000).
3. Professor RobertLawry, Speech at the Annual Meeting oftheAssociation for Practical
and Professional Ethics, Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 28, 1998).
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correspondingly, of religious and secular considerations in political decision. Here
I shall leave aside institutional church-state relations and concentrate on the second
kind of separation, the kind required by ideals governing individual conduct 4
A. SecularRationale
To capture one of these ideals, I propose aprincipleof secularrationale. It says
that citizens in a liberal democracy have a prima facie obligation not to advocate or
support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless they have, and
are willing to offer, an adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support (say for
a vote). I want to stress immediately that this principle does not imply the negative
requirement that one should not also have a religious reason, or that no such reason
may be offered. Suppose I want to advocate mandatory periods of prayer or
meditation in public schools. According to the secular rationale principle, I should
have an adequate secular reason for this, such as its being psychologically essential
for the nation's youth. If the only reason I have for my advocacy is to promote
religious ideals, I would not satisfy this principle. Here are some points by way of
clarification.
1. Two Kinds of Coercion
First, it is clear that most laws and public policies do restrict human conduct; and
the more restrictive they are, the stronger the relevant obligation. It is useful in this
context, in which our concern is relations between institutions (especially
governmental ones) and the individuals under their authority, to distinguishprimary
coercion and secondary coercion. The first requires a particular action, such as
paying tax at a certain level or submitting to inoculation. The second operates on the
basis of the former, as where one's taxes-already legally required-are spent partly
in ways one disapproves of, so one is in a sense funding something against one's
will. Other things equal, primary coercion is more in need of justification than is
secondary coercion. Showing that a kind of coercive action, such as taxation, is
warranted in the first place, tends to be more difficult than showing that, given a
presupposition of itsjustification, the appropriate authorities may (in accord with the
justifying grounds for the coercion) use the funds in ways that contravene the will
of some citizens. It is possible, however, that secondary coercionbe quite unjustified
even where the corresponding primary coercion is justified. A paradigm case would
be the kind in which the secondary coercion is inconsistent with the rationale for the
primary. If, for instance, taxation is warranted for the public welfare, using the
revenue to suppress free speech could not be justified by it.

4. For a discussion of a number of church-state issues, including limits of free exercise
and various establishment questions, see ROBERTAUDI&NICHOLAS WOLTERSTOFF, RELIGION

IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CoNvIcTioNs IN PoImcAL DEBATE 3-116

(1997).
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2. The Notion of a Secular Reason

Second, I am taking a secular reason as roughly one whose normative force, that
is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not evidentially depend on
the existence of God (or on denying it) or on theological considerations, or on the
pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.5 Roughly, this is
to say that a secular reason is a ground that enables one to know or have justification
for a proposition, such as a moral principle, independently of having knowledge of,
orjustification forbelieving, a religious proposition. Evidentialindependence ofGod
on the part of reasons does not imply independence of God in general.' I should add
that I am thinking of religion in a fairly rich sense. It will not do in this context to
construe it functionally, for instande as involving whatever is ultimate in someone's
value system, or existentially, say in terms of what values and assumptions give
"meaning" to one's life. The functionalist conception is vividly expressed in the idea
that "[e]ventually there is something to which every knee bows. This is the person's
god.... [A]s a matter of practice, no one escapes ceding ultimacy to something,
whether it deserves ultimacy or not" 7 There is some truth in the vicinity ofthis idea,
though there may be a set of two or more values that are equally ultimate for a
person, and over even a short time one's "ultimates" may change. But no such notion
will serve as a basis for defining the concept ofreligion: a valuational naturalist, and
even an unselfconscious Humean without a shred of piety and for whom reason is
properly the slave of passion, could satisfy this characterization, as well as many of
the existential ones. Nor will it do to identify a religious outlook with a

5. See Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of
Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 259, 265-68 (1989). The principle applies with different
degrees of force in different contexts; in some the prima facie obligation in question is
stronger, in others quite weak. Moreover, the adequacy requirement rules out some
nonreligious reasons, for example, those that are ill grounded; but my concern here is with
the specifically religious in relation to the political. I might add that the principle is not meant
to require that an adequate reason be objectively correct in a sense implying that it is
equivalent to a true proposition. A false proposition that is sufficiently welljustified can count
as an adequate reason.
6. It does not, for example, imply the possibility of existing apart from divine creation.
In case it should seem that affirming the evidential independence of God on the part of
reasons is somehow irreverent, let me note that the most famous arguments for the existence
of God are supposed to have premises with just this status. This applies, for example, to St.
Thomas Aquinas's five famous arguments for the existence of God. Ifthey did not, they would
fail of their purpose, which is roughly to provide evidential ground for believing God exists,
on the basis of considerations not dependent on one's already having that ground.
7. J. Budziszewski, The Illusion ofMoral Neutrality,FiRsT THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 1993,
at 32, 36. The intention is clearly that every knee ultimately bows to something or other,not
to something in particular, which would imply a particular ultimate commitment for all ofus.
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"comprehensive" view, as some have done, or a "'comprehensive claim... about
human authenticity."' 8 These three notions of religion are all too broad to provide
a reasonable basis for taking secular reason to play an essential role in civic virtue.9
3. Prima Facie Obligation
Third, I take a prima facie obligation to be one that provides a reason for action
which is (a) strong enough to justify the action in the absence of conflicting
considerations, but (b) can also be overridden by one or more such considerations.
Among the overriders of the obligation to be willing to offer a secular reason are
special circumstances in which secrecy is necessary, as where one would be harmed
if certain people knew what candidate one was supporting. As to the obligation to
have an adequate secular reason, one possible overrider would occur in a case in
which one suddenly finds that one must vote, sees that the opposition is voting on
a conflicting religious basis, and is sure that an adequate secular reason for one's
vote can be found when one explores the issue further.0 Overriders may be common
in some circumstances; but there are myriad cases in which they do not occur, and
in any event a conscientious citizen who appeals to an overrider should bear the
burden of showing that in fact it is one.
4. The Accommodationist Character of the
Secular Rationale Principle
It should be clear by now that the principle ofsecular rationale is not anti-religious
or negative toward religion in either of two respects suggested in a recent article:
Scholars like Bruce Ackerman and Robert Audi have introduced into legal and

political philosophy two of the "dogmas of liberalism" regarding religion in
public life.... [F]irst... that religious beliefs are irrational or non-rational and
therefore cannot meet the standards ofpublic reason .... [Slecond... that there

8. Mark Modak-Truran, The Religious Dimension ofJudicialDecisionMakingand the
De FactoDisestablishment,81 MARQ. L. REV. 255,263 (1998). Butsee id. at 262-63,287-88
(adopting a comprehensive view and asserting that courts, despite efforts not to, have done

so as well).
9. One further clarification may also help here. I am taking an evidential dependence on
denying the existence of God to imply nonsecularity on at least two grounds. For one thing,
as distinct from a philosophical rejection of the meaningfulness of religious language, such

a denial engages religion but in a negative way that implies a kind of anti-religion and
presupposes a kind of theological knowledge. For another, if we allow secular reasons to

presuppose the nonexistence of God, they cannot play the neutral role appropriate to them in
a democratic framework that is neutral with respect to religion.
10. For one ofthe most influential treatments ofprima facie reasons, see W. D. Ross, THE
RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930). I discuss Ross's conception in detail, clarify it, and bring out
how knowledge ofmajor moral principles can have a basis in secular reason in ROBERTAUDI,
Intuitionism,Pluralism,andthe FoundationsofEthics,in MORALKNOWLEDGE
CHARACTER 32 (1997).
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are no available decision procedures for resolving religiously based moral
disagreements.... Thus, so the common argument goes, religion should be
relegated to the private realm and prohibited from public affairs."
I find this attribution puzzling, since much of what I have said on religion and
politics indicates rejection of both dogmas. Let me outline some ways in which
religious elements may beneficially enter "public affairs."
Consider the point of view of a religious citizen who wants to live harmoniously
in a liberal democracy. How might such a person regard the principle of secular
rationale from the perspective of theological assumptions that are standard in
Western theism? Might one not think that the principle is religiously acceptable
given God's having created a world in which religious differences are pervasive and
secular protections of liberty apparently appeal to all adequately informed, rational
persons? One might note in this connection that the principle does not preclude
substantial appeal to religious considerations, and one might find that often they are
harmonious with secular moral standards. It is in fact consistent with Michael
Perry's thesis that religious considerations shouldbe brought ihto public political
discussion for the purpose of testing them. 2
Indeed, I would argue that on theological assumptions standardly made by much
of Western theism, including the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and
omnibenevolent, there is reason to expect rational, adequately informed religious
citizens to be able to achieve theo-ethicalequilibrium,a rational integration between
religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical
considerations. In the effort to reach this equilibrium, secular reason can lead to
modifying one's religious views, and religious considerations can lead to revision of
one's secular moral views. The natural law tradition, for instance, would seem to
support the idea that such equilibrium is a reasonable goal for theists. Thomas
Aquinas held both that moral principles are accessible to human reason and that
revelation has its own moral authority.' 3 (It is noteworthy that St. Paul wrote,
"[w]hen Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the Law,
these.., show the work of the Law written in their hearts.") 4 In the ideal case, there
should be a very high degree of overlap between religiously sound general moral
principles and moral principles cogently supported by secular reason. Consider, for
example, the purely ethical injunctions ofthe Ten Commandments: these essentially
coincide with elements in the most plausible secular ethical systems.
It may be objected that at least for religious people who do not think in secular
terms, the principle ofsecular rationale would restrict democratic participation. They
would, for instance, be unable to engage in public discourse in secular terms. 5 Many

11. Ronald F. Thiemann, Religion andLegalDiscourse:An IndirectRelation,81 MARQ.
L. REv. 289,296 (1998). Thiemann served as Dean ofthe Harvard Divinity School at the time
the article was written.
12. For a discussion of Perry's thesis, see Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and
ReligiousMorality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1998).
13. See id. at 28 n.77 (discussing JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKTNG OF MORAL THEOLOGY:
A STUDY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC TRADITON 105-06 (1987)).

14. Romans 2:14-15 (New American Standard).
15. This objection is made by (among others) Jeff Jordan in attacking the principle of
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points can be made in reply. Here are two. First, much democratic participation does
not require advocacy or support of restrictive laws or policies: one can query
opponents and criticize their objectionable positions; formulate a variety of guiding
ideals, religious as well as secular; discuss the quality of the records of the people or
political parties in question; or arouse concern about the issues in question. Second,
the principle of secular rationale does not restrict freedom of speech, and the
requirement of adequate secular reason does not constrain the expression ofreligious
reasons, much less religious language.
B. SecularMotivation
A second principle I suggest-theprincipleofsecular motivation-saysthat one

has a (prima facie) obligation to abstain from advocacy or support of a law or public
policy that restricts human conduct, unless one is sufficiently motivated by
(normatively) adequate secular reason, where sufficiency of motivation here implies
that some set of secular reasons is motivationally sufficient, roughly in the sense that
(a) this set of reasons explains one's action and (b) one would act on it even if, other
things remaining equal, one's other reasons were eliminated. This second principle
is less important than the rationale principle to the partial ethics of citizenship I am
proposing for liberal democracies, but it is still quite significant. It is also more
difficult to interpret and apply.
One reason why the motivation principle is needed for a full articulation of
standards of civic virtue is that since an argument can be tacitly religious without
being religious in content, one might fail to adhere to the principle even in offering
arguments that on their face are neither religious nor fail to provide adequate secular
reason for their conclusion. Consider, for instance, the argument that since there is
no clear line between reasonably cooperating with a well-considered wish to die and
pushing a weakened patient over the line to suicide, we should disallow all assisted
suicide. Some people who offer this argument might not be sufficiently motivated by
the secular considerations cited in it, and (quite apart from whether it is objectively
sound) would not find the argument convincing apart from their underlying religious
beliefs. They might, for example, be moved entirely by the belief that life is a gift
from God and only God should take it.
The principle of secular motivation may also be plausibly taken to rule out a
certain kind of anti-religious motivation as properly necessary in coercive
sociopolitical action. Imagine a scientific argument aimed at preventing creationism
from being discussed in a public school science course: the secular considerations it
cites might not be motivating, and if it is proposed from anti-religious motivation of
a kind that does not count as secular, then even if it accords with the rationale
principle, offering it does not accord with the motivation principle. Its proponent

secular rationale. He says, for example, "Despite the initial appeal of the idea that one should
couch public discoursein terms of public reasons, there are at least two reasons to think that
adopting the PSR [principle of secular rationale] is ill-advised . .. the PSR carries an
unpalatable epistemic consequence .. . [and] would hinder political participation." Jeff
Jordan, Religious Reasons and PublicReasons, II PuB. AFF. Q.243, 248 (1997) (emphasis
added). But see infra Part Im for standards to guide prudence in public discourse.
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lacks a set of secular reasons that is both evidentially adequate and motivationally
sufficient. 6 If civicvirtue constrains religious motivation when it comes to coercing
others from religious motives, it also constrains anti-religions motivation.
Consider, by contrast, arguing for a voucher system on the ground that parents,
and especially religions ones, shouldbe free to educate their children in academically
adequate schools of their choice, including those that teach a particular religious
point of view, and so should receive a voucher for each child, which can be used
toward the costs of their children's attending any accredited school.' 7 Here the
content of the proposed legislation, unlike that of proposed restrictions of assisted
suicide, includes a concern with religion and even envisages some likelihood of
promoting its practice; but the groundgiven for the legislation is not intrinsically
religious. One could support a voucher system on this ground without specially
favoring the religious over, say, nonreligious people simply dissatisfied with the
general quality of public education, just as legislators can take account of the
religiously based preferences of their constituents as their deep-seated preferences
without thereby favoring the religious as such over other constituents." If, however,
pressing for a voucher system conforms to the principle of secular motivation, then
some such secular consideration should be both (normatively) adequate and
sufficiently motivating. If one's only reason for supporting vouchers is to promote
the religious devotion of one's children (or other children), then even if one is
expressing a kind of religious virtue, one is not exhibiting civic virtue. 9
These points do not address the constitutional issues that remain. Even if there is
adequate secular reason to permit voucher systems in a free democracy, it does not
follow that they accord with First Amendment's Establishment Clause standards. It
might also be argued, however, that disallowing them burdens the free exercise of
religion in that parents who want their children religiously educated must undertake

16. Not just any anti-religious motivation would fail to count as secular, for example,
where the desire is simply to weaken a religious group enough to prevent its dominating a
society. But for purposes of taking the motivation principle to be an element in civic virtue
it is reasonable to construe a desire to destroy a religion or to discredit its deity as nonsecular.
17. The accrediting may take account of certain factors that are not purely academic. It is
one thing to give vouchers to support free parental choice, including religious choice; it is
another to allow them where racial discrimination is practiced. It is a delicate and difficult
question when criteria of admission are objectionable in a way that warrants differential
governmental treatment.
18. It is noteworthy that in the Netherlands the government funds both public and
sectarian schools, compensating, inpart, forthe differences this allows among publicly funded
schools by requiring national examinations keyed to a core curriculum constituting 80% of
what students study in the secondary school years. See Laurel Shaper Walters, Schoolingfor
Jobs, CHRmTiAN SCI. MoNrroR, Dec. 14, 1992, at 10.
19. One may wonder how a religious person who seeks to do everything in fulfillment of
God's will can abide by the principle of secular motivation. Note that such a person can
without irreverence be motivated by the sense of just conduct as dictated by the dignity of
persons, at least where being thus dictated is equivalent to the property of being commanded
by God as a standard for human conduct. The same point surely holds where the person
justifiedly believes this equivalence to hold (and perhaps even in certain cases in which the
belief is not justified).
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both to see to that and to pay taxes for public education."0 The Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses can pull in different directions. The rationale and motivation
principles are not intended as even partial interpretations ofthe Constitution, though
at least the former may be useful in understanding it. They are intended to guide
citizens in any free democracy.
The stress on secular reasons as evidential and motivational elements important
in the ethics of citizenship does not imply that no other constraints on appropriate
reasons are required, such as prohibitions of racist grounds for public policy. This
is not the place for an account of what makes certain reasons appropriate overall.
Religious reasons, conceived, for instance, as reasons for human conduct that are
ultimately grounded in God's nature or commands (or, at least from the point of
view of religious persons, are rationally believed to be so grounded), are a major
subject in their own right. There are some respects in which they are special in
relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with other reasons-such as certain
"intuitive" deliverances about other people-that are not accessible to any normal
adult and are often inadequate though clearly secular.2
Here are some salient points: (1) The kinds of religious reasons most relevant to
the shape of contemporary societies are directly or indirectly taken to represent an
infallible authority, in a sense implying that the propositions expressing them must
be true and should thus be universally heeded.' (2) Very commonly those who
identify with what they regard as the ultimate divine source of religious reasons
believe that anyone who does not identify with it is forsaken, damned, or otherwise
fundamentally deficient. Disobedience or even nonconformity can carry eternal
punishment. This disapproval of nonconformity is often enhanced or even inflamed
by others' openly rejecting the relevant command or standard, as is common in, for
example, sexual matters. (3) Religious reasons often dictate practices that are
distinctively religious in content (such as prayer) or intent (such as preserving a fetus
on the ground that it is a child of God), and therefore are plausibly seen in some
20. A number of the papers in this issue are pertinent to the constitutional status of
vouchers. See Martha McCarthy, Religion andEducation:Whiterthe EstablishmentClause?,
75 IND. L.J. 123 (2000); Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as
CausativeAgent in EstablishmentClause Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000).
21. Accessibility in the relevant sense is no simple matter ordinary sensory data of the
kind needed to use a ruler or a gauge are clearly accessible, and a clairvoyant sense about the
future is clearly not. But it might be argued that anyone who is open-minded, considers
natural theology, and attends certain religious services in a good-faith effort to find God
thereby has access to good theistic reasons for a certain view of the world. Many people who
reluctantly or ambivalently leave their faith would claim to be counterexamples to this; but
even if their judgment is accepted, the notion of accessibility is not precise and will remain
controversial.
22. This does not imply that these propositions are necessarily true simpliciterbut that it
is impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false. Thus, one may
presumably be as certain of their truth as one is that they are divinely endorsed or accepted.
For many people this is a very high degree of certainty. For instructive discussion of the kind
of attitudes in question here, with analysis of various sorts of fundamentalisms inthe context
of American democracy, see Daniel 0. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious
Fundamentalism,and the Searchfor Truth in ContemporaryAmerica, 12 J.L. & RELIGION
337 (1995-96).
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cases as forcing others to observe a religious standard. (4) For at least many
religions-and commonly for cults-rational,relevantly informed outsiders are
unable to discern effective checks on certain possible tendencies for clergy (or, in
some cases, votaries) to project, whether consciously or otherwise, their own views
or preferences into their interpretations of one or another authoritative religious
source, including even God.' In The Merchant of Venice Bessanio laments our
tendency to be "deceived with ornament"; suggesting that erroneous religious ideas
as well as mistaken secular claims can be backed by appeals to authoritative sources,
he says:
In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But, being seasoned with a gracious voice,
Obscures the show of evil? In religion,
What damned error but some sober brow
Will bless it and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?24
(5) Owing to some of these points, religious people often tend to be, in a way that
seems significantly less commoninsecular matters, highly and stubbornlypassionate
about the importance of everyone's acting in accordance with religious reasons, and
nonreligious people often tend to be highly and stubbornly passionate about not
being coerced to do so. (6) Partly because religious liberty is a constitutive
foundation (or at the very least a cogent rationale) for liberal democracy, citizens in
such a state are naturally and permissibly resentful about coercion by religious
factors (which may lead to restrictions of their specifically religious behavior), in a
way they are not permissibly resentful concerning coercion by, for instance,
considerations of public health.' (7) One further element might be called
intergenerationality.It is characteristic of religious commitment in a way it may be
characteristic of no other kind of institutional commitment that one tends to want to

23. Stephen Carter puts a related point vividly when he says, 'Ihave always been deeply
offended by politicians, whether on the left or on the right, who are ready to seize on the
language and symbols of religion in order to grub for votes." STEPHEN L. CARTEiR, THE
CULTURE oFDiSBTF: HowAMERICANLAWANDPOLrICS TRIvIAuZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION

47(1993).
24. WmLAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 3, sc. 2, lines 75-80 (David
Bevington ed., Harper-Collins Publishers 1992).
25. It is worth stressing two points here. (1) Nothing I have said about religious reasons
entails that religion is necessarily either "esoterie" or in any way irrational, or even that there
cannot be cogent arguments for God's existence from nonreligious premises. (2) To certain
kinds of religion, for example, Unitarianism-particularly the more common nontheistic
forms-these points apply far less than to many other religions. There may indeed be forms
of Unitarianism and other broadly religious outlooks that are not plausibly considered
religions-though they would be religious, in the sense John Dewey noted, in which
appropriate attitudes, for example of reverence, can mark a perspective as religious even if
it is not part of a religion. Dewey's distinction among the notions of religion, the religious,
and a religion is a major topic of definition that I cannot address directly in this paper. See
JoHN DEWEY, A COMMON FArm (1934).
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bring up one's children (if one has any) in the faith. With this desire often goes a
sense of alienation if they reject the faith once brought up in it. In the present age,
many have learned to live with such alienation; but it remains a source of deep
concern, normally more so than counterpart reactions to apostasy in aesthetic,
political, and sometimes even ethical matters.
If, however, we should separate the state from the church, and indeed treat
religious reasons for sociopolitical action as posing some special challenges in a free
democracy, why should we not also separate the state from secular conceptions of the
good? People have also killed in their name. This is a large issue, and here I can
make just a few points by way of brief reply. First, liberal democracies by their very
nature presuppose some goods and some evils: liberty is a good, slavery an evil;
political equality is a good, subverting the voting process an evil. Second (and less
commonly noted), a liberal democracy must also provide some account ofwhat kinds
of things warrant restrictingliberty. These include considerations of public health;
compulsory education; and harms, such as causing pain, to others.
Some values, then, are presupposed, and often invoked, by liberal democracy.
When one considers how education (to take just one major example) must be
understood both in relation to a conception of worthwhile knowledge and in relation
to achieving qualifications for citizenship and the capacity for certain kinds of
human flourishing, it becomes plain that liberal democracies cannot pretend to be
altogether neutral regarding all goods and evils. There are, to be sure, degrees of
value commitment, but it must not be thought that a sound democracy can simply
accord votes to all capable of casting them and permit any conduct whatever that
meets with majority approval.
It might still seem that the motivation for a deed should not matter if the quality
of one's reasons for it is good enough. This is one place where an action
unobjectionable under structural principles suitable for a liberal democracy may be
deficient from the point ofview of principles of civic virtue applicable to the conduct
of individual citizens. But I would stress that insofar as we are thinking of conduct
as that which is supposed to be actionfrom virtue, we should look notjust at the type
26
of action in question, but also at the grounding of actions in the agent's character.
In Kantian fashion (and on this particular point Kant is quite in line with
Aristotelian virtue theory), we should distinguish actions from civic virtue and
actions merely in conformity with it. I grant that morally, one may, within one's
rights, advocate a coercive course of action without being motivated by an adequate
secular reason for that action; my contention is that to do so is not always consonant
with civic virtue.
I find it helpful here to reflect on the difference between what we say and what we
communicate, roughly between the semantic value of our words and the total
information conveyed by what we say given its intonation and context. This
difference is particularly relevant to public debate, where voicing, attitude, and even
body language can be important elements; but it also has significant application in
private discussions. We speak with different voices on different occasions, to

26. I provide an account of such notion which supports the conception of it employed here
in ROBERT AUDI, Acting from Virtue, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ErI-CAL CHARACTER,
supranote 10, at 174, 175-76.
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different audiences, and for different purposes. Even when they carry the same
content, say that a certain kind of act is wrong, human voices can differ as radically
as the textures of different surfaces having the same color, or the timbres and
resonances of different musical instruments sounding the same note. It is what
produces those notes-a vibrating string, a column of air in a reed, a stroke to a
stretched membrane-and not their pitch, that yields the quality of the instruments
sounding them, and similarly with human speech it is the motivational and
attitudinal basis of what we say, and not its content, that yields our voice.' Many
different intonations are possible for any given content we express. And both in
public discourse and in private conversation we tend to listen for voicing as well as
content We tly to hear more than just what people say, construed as asserted
semantic content; and quite commonly we accept-or reject-what others say
because of how they voice it as well as because of what it is.
Part ofcivic virtue consists in having and using an appropriate civic voice in one's
life as a citizen; part of civic harmony in a pluralistic society consists in enough of
the people using that voice as their primary mode of communication in debating
issues important for citizens, especially fundamental ones such as the extent of our
liberties. A civic voice is also valuable in discussing lesser matters. Our intonations
can and should change, however, both within a stretch of discourse and from one
context to another, and a civic voice need not be any citizen's only voice, not even
for argumentation, and certainly not for self-expression. But a civic voice is
important for controversial matters in a public context of plural and possibly
irreconcilable values, and it is achievable by any rational citizen committed to liberal
democracy. To lack such a voice, or to use it too infrequently, is a significant failure
in civic virtue.
II. RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Given the principles so far proposed, one might think that I stand with those
liberal theorists who would like to keep religion out of "the public square."' There
is an ambiguity here that should be clearly exposed. Keeping religion out of the
public square might mean at least three things (or combinations thereof): (1) keeping
religious language out; (2) keeping religious considerations from exercising
sociopolitical influence; and (3) keeping concern with religion from exercising such

27. Our voice is, however, likely to be also determined in partby what we say, and other
things equal a civic voice is not fully achieved ifone is proposing religious reasons as grounds
for public policy decisions. It may be possible, however, to present such reasons in a context
that preserves a certain balance, for example, by noting that in addition to sufficient secular
reasons for a piece of legislation, such as permitting state-aid to handicapped children in
religious schools, many religious citizens will feel better able to provide for their children
services they believe God requires. Thus, the emphasis on achieving a proper civic voice as
part of civic virtue leads to no simple rule about the admissible content of advocacy of laws
or public policies.
28. "Richard Rorty is an example." Philip L. Quinn, PoliticalLiberalisms and Their
Exclusions of the Religious, PRoc. & ADDREssEs AM. PHL. Ass'I.r, Nov. 1995, at 35. For
further discussion of the topic of liberal theory and religion in the public square, see id. at 38-
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influence. I do not think that any responsible liberal position endorses the third
exclusion: one can take religion to be important, for instance as abasis for designing
a social studies curriculum, without making anyjudgment on its intrinsic worth; and
one must indeed take it to be important in according full respect to the abiding
concerns of a vast number of citizens. As to eliminating the sociopolitical role of
religious considerations, no plausible liberal position endorses thatkind ofexclusion.
My principles call for a measure of restraint; but they neither deny a right to give
those considerations a major role, nor restrict their role to a degree that prevents
religious considerations often determining conduct. It is the third exclusion-which
goes with a kind ofrhetoricalprivatization-that
I particularly want to address here.
I begin with some distinctions that facilitate analysis.
A. Implicitly Versus Explicitly Religious Discourse

Even apart from a focus limited to Western religion, it is clear that discourse may
be religious without being explicitly so, as is typical of prayer. Whereas explicitly
religious discourse openly uses religious language such as references to God's will
or to the content of the Bible, implicitly religious discourse is recognizable as
religious only on the basis of an acquaintance with the religion or religious
orientation or content in question, orby inference from some such acquaintance with
a religion or religious concepts. There are also expressions that can be taken as
religious or not depending on the context: phrases like "It is not given to us to
understand," "the ultimate purpose of our existence," and "the sanctity of life" may
render discourse in which they occur implicitly religious. Sometimes, however, a
mere allusion or a single metaphor can render a segment of discourse implicitly
religious. Describing someone as believing that science is "the light of the world"
readily evokes a New Testament metaphor for Christ and would ordinarily suggest
religiously grounded disapproval. Arguing for expanded welfare provisions by saying
that a society is judged by what it does for the poor and the sick may evoke Jesus's
saying that what people have done to "the least" of society they have done to him.
Here, as elsewhere, intonation and context are crucial both for understanding the
speaker (or writer) and for judging the appropriateness of the discourse.
B. Mixed Versus Unmixed Religious Discourse

This second distinction cuts across the explicit-implicit one; implicitly religious
discourse, for instance, might or might not be mixed with large secular segments.
One can imagine a clergyman testifying on, say capital punishment, using either
entirely secular language or, instead, both explicitly and implicitly religious
discourse in an effort to harmonize them in a mixture with stretches of secular
discourse about such evidences as scientific studies of deterrence. And any literate
person might, in a single speech to the same effect, appeal to Jesus's call for
forgiveness, to psychological studies of its good effects, and to Clarence Darrow's
case for hard determinism as undermining criminal responsibility.
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C. PrimarilyandSecondarily Religious Discourse

This third distinction is not quantitative even to the extent that the previous one
is; the primary-secondary contrast is mainly a matter of grounding and
presuppositions rather than vocabulary. Mixed discourse that is secular in most of
its vocabulary could be primarily religious because it constantly presupposes
religious principles and concludes with a religiously based point that draws together
its various elements. Such discourse is primarily religious because it is rooted in
religious presupposition and its main thrust is one or more religious points. On the
other hand, discourse pervaded by Biblical allusions and Biblical metaphors could
be primarily secular because of its underlying assumptions and main arguments. The
use of these allusions and metaphors could be a literary device for explication or
even parody. There are also intermediate cases: the language might, for instance,
invoke a religious view about divine plan in arguing for something that, overall, the
advocate defends far more prominently on a secular basis.
D. Persuasiveand DescriptiveReligious Discourse

Fourth, as in other contexts, we should distinguish the persuasive from the merely
descriptive use of language, and within the persuasive category, between attempts
to persuade of a religious view and uses of religious considerations to persuade of a
secular view. Many Biblical stories are, for instance, powerfully descriptive in sheer
literary terms, but they need not be used persuasively and often are not so used. With
an aim that is explanatory rather than persuasive, one could say of a man who,
owing to divided loyalties, failed to realize his ideals, "He tried to serve God and
mammon." Compare this with saying "You cannot serve God and mammon" to
remind people that they are abandoning their ideals for money-something one can
say even if the ideals are secular. Here one would be using religious language
persuasively, but not religiously. By contrast, appeals to Biblical or religious
authority in support of aview one is pressing, or invocations of religious arguments
to establish one's view, constitute a religiously persuasive use of religious language.
(Such persuasive discourse may not actually tend to persuade; the contrast is mainly
a matter of apparently intended function rather than effect.)
E. Self-DirectedandAudience-DirectedReligious Discourse

A fifth distinction concerns the relation of discourse to the speaker more than its
content: religious discourse may be simply about oneself, say self-identificational,
as where one indicates one's religious roots or commitments, as opposed to audiencedirected. In the former case nothing need be explicitly indicated about where one
stands on an issue under discussion. Religious believers may be as it were
introducing themselves to a new friend, or (as is often appropriate) clarifying their
own stance for themselves or others, or rededicating themselves by saying things that
connect them with the crucial religious text or their religious tradition. In the case
of audience-directed religious discourse, one seeks to move the audience, say to
convince fellow citizens of something. Here, even if one is apparently endorsing
religious premises, one need not be identifying oneself as a religious person, as
opposed to abeliever of those particular propositions, as grounds for one's point. The
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guiding concern is to move the audience, and.religious self-identification might not
figure in the effort. One might, however, make such an effort by citing mutual
religious commitments presented as such; there one would, to some extent, identify
oneself religiously, though the discourse as a whole could be audience-directed.
F. AuthoritarianandModerate Religious Discourse

Cutting across all ofthe distinctions I have made is a sixth, closely connected with
civic voice. I refer to the distinction between authoritarian and moderate religious
discourse. Intonation alone can create an authoritarian character (as indeed with
secular discourse), but that effect often comes from an implication or suggestion,
through tone or content or both, that one in some sense must be right. By contrast,
a fallibilist attitude tends to eliminate authoritarianism in tone or content.
Authoritarianism can, of course, come from content as well as tone. The politest,
most soft-spoken speech can simply cloak that attitude or stance. It should be added
that the relevant kind ofmoderateness, the kind that contrasts with authoritarianism,
is cognitive; passional immoderateness, for instance, might readily combine with a
keen sense that one might be mistaken in the view (or vision) in question.
G. Directlyand IndirectlyArgumentative Religious Discourse

This brings us to a seventh distinction (foreshadowed earlier): between arguing
from religious reasons and leveraging by religious reasons. In the first case, one
gives the audience to understand that one accepts the relevant reasons (say that
ensoulment occurs at conception) and one represents the conclusion proposed as
supported by them; in the second, one implies that the audience accepts the reasons
and one represents the conclusion one is arguing for as supported by them. The latter
is a paradigm of audience-directed religious discourse. It may, but need not, be
manipulative. Religious discourse may also be indirectly argumentative in other
ways. The conclusion argued for may be left implicit, or premises for it may be
presented in separate places and not identified as such, whereas in paradigms of
direct argumentation it is made evident both what the conclusion is and what the
indicated grounds are.
Many other discourse-related distinctions might reasonably be made here, but
these are sufficient to enable us to articulate some standards applicable to public
discourse in free democracies.
III. SOME STANDARDS FOR THE SOCIOPOLITICAL

USE OF RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

The freedom of expression appropriate to liberal democracy permits citizens
and-though to a lesser extent (depending on their office)-public officials to use
religious language in the public sphere." But, as I have suggested, both should speak

29. See

KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSEQUENCES AND PUBuC REASONS 141-64

(1995). One of Greenawalt's summary statements runs: "I urge that judicial opinions should
always be cast in terms ofreasons that are broadly public, and that narrowpolitical discussion
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mainly with a civic voice in public discussions oflaw or public policy. Once we note
how many ways there are to use religious language, it becomes a difficult question
to what extent publicly using such language is consonant with civic virtue. This is
plainly a case for prudence. We need an Aristotelian mean between excess and
deficiency. There are, however, several plausible guiding principles. It will be no
surprise if I suggest that my principles of civic virtue apply here, particularly seen
in the light of their grounding in the basic liberal-democratic idea that governmental
coercion should be justifiable on the basis of secular reason.
It has seemed to some readers that my principles of secular rationale and
motivation severely constrain one's use ofreligious language in public.' This is not
so. The most general point is that a constraint on the evidential and motivating
reasons one should have is independent of the language one uses in making one's
case. The need for adequate secular reason does not preclude or unduly constrain the
use of religious language, particularly if religious reasons are also given a major
place in thought and action and are appropriately expressed.
There is, moreover, one respect in which my perspective affords more freedom in
one's choice of language than a number of other liberal positions, including that of
John Rawls at least prior to his qualification of his long-standing position, which
now allows that "reasonable such [comprehensive] doctrines may be introduced in
public reason at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a
reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the
comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support."31 Since, on my principles,
adherents of a view can honestly repudiate anyone's supporting governmental
coercion without evidentially adequate and motivationally sufficient reason, they are
(other things equal) morefree to stress the religions elements in their thinking. If we
are taken to be sincere in commitment to my principles-and particularly ifthere is
as much alignment between secular morality and religiously grounded morality as
I think there commonly is--we can explicitly bring forward religious considerations
without offending enlightened people who have no religious beliefs or belong to
another religion.
To be"sure, one is not likely to be thought sincere in endorsing my principles if
one's public discourse is of an unmixed religions kind, or if reference to secular
grounds for one's position seems perfunctory. This brings us to our first general
discourse principle: in public discourse, one should avoid making a sociopolitical
issue appear to be a religious issue (the converse is also plausible, but not my
concern here). Take assisted suicide. This is a moral issue as well as a religious one,
and it is religiously as well as morally contested. One liability of treating it

by public officials and by most 'quasi-public' citizens, like newspaper editors and presidents
of large corporations, should generally be carried on in terms of such reasons." Id. at 7.
30. See, e.g., Jordan, supranote 15, at 248; Quinn, supranote 28, at 37 (noting that there
are liberal positions which call for this). Quinn cites Richard Rorty as advocating the view
Rorty called Jeffersonian compromise: that religion be privatized and kept out of the public
square. See id. at 35 (citing Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper,3 COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994)).
31. JOHN RAWIs, PoLrTIcAL LIBERALISM at li-ii (1993); cf John Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHL L. REV. 765 (1997) (providing a later, compatible
treatment).
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religiously in a public setting is polarizationalong religiouslines. Polarization in

the relevant sense is not merely sharp disagreement and is not even a necessary
consequence of deep disagreement. I use it to refer to (roughly) a difference of
conviction that is, or is at least persistently felt to be, irreconcilable, is attended by
hostile attitudes in each direction, and lacks common ground sufficient to make
reconciliation promising. Different religions may have more or less official stances
on the matter; a sociopolitical decision about legal limits need not prejudge the
religious or even moral soundness of these stances. Free democracies may, for
various reasons, legally permit conduct they consider immoral or religiously
forbidden, such as (inexcusably) breaking a promise to a friend. If the legalization
issue is not considered specifically religious, its resolution is less likely to alienate
a disapproving religions group.
Since there are other ways polarization along religious lines may be caused, it is
well to adopt a second public discourse principle here: in public discourse, one
should seek to frame any religious treatment of a sociopolitical issue in a way that
avoids polarization along religious lines. Granted that all polarization is prima facie
bad and that we need further distinctions and principles to help us avoid it, religious
polarization is uniquely serious. A clash of Gods-or even of clerical
authorities--easily becomes a battle to the death.
A third principle concerns differences in sociopolitical role: the public discourse
of ordinary citizens is generally less constrained as to appropriate religious content
than that of government officials, and among them the highest constraints tend to
be on the judiciary. There are considerable differences even within each of these
categories: a preliminary discussion of a proposed local ordinance among citizens
in the town hall is one thing; a citizen's formal testimony before the state legislature
is another, and generally more constraining. A legislator's conversations on a
Saturday radio show is, similarly, less constrained than the same person's speech in
support of a bill that is about to be voted on in the legislature.
If we keep in mind the importance of avoiding coercion on religious grounds, we
can see the plausibility of a related principle. Once again, I think the secular
rationale principle is suggestive of an appropriate standard for public discourse that
supports or suggests coercion. It supports what might be called a priiciple of
minimal coercive suggestion: other things equal, the more likely one's public
discourse is to be understood as supporting coercive laws or public policies, the
greater the appropriate restraints on using religions language or otherwise making
one's discourse religious (in any of the indicated ways). This principle helps to
account for differences in the restraints appropriate for public officials setting forth
their views in differing contexts.
If I am right in thinking that moderate discourse tends to reduce resentment and
to enable cooperation more than authoritarian discourse, we might adopt the
principle that, especially though by no means exclusively in religions public
discourse, moderate discourse is to be preferred. Commitment to the principles of
secular rationale and motivation is a significant support of moderation in both tone
and content. I hasten to add, however, that this commitment does not necessarily
require giving up the position that one's view-religious or secular-is better
grounded than alternatives or even in some way epistemically privileged; it simply
provides an incentive to have and offer adequate secular reason for support of
coercion, and to use a voice for expressing such reasons, that can give other citizens
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a sense of being treated with respect and of a range of mutually respected standards
available for compromise. It should go without saying that there are counterpart
restraints appropriate to those using wholly secular discourse; they should, for
instance, also aim at expressing and preserving respect for fellow citizens regardless
of their religions position.
Referring back to the distinctions made in this Part, we might say something more
general: other things equal, public discourse on sociopolitical matters is ethically less
constrained as to religions content where that content is implicit rather than explicit,
mixed rather than unmixed, secondarily rather than primarily religious, descriptive
rather than persuasive, self-directed rather than audience-directed, and moderate
rather than authoritarian. To say, for instance, that we should protect the natural
environment to make it possible for all citizens to enjoy green pastures and still
waters may for many evoke the Twenty-Third Psalm, and to say that a proposed
development would deprive the foxes of their holes and birds oftheir nests may, for
some, evoke Jesus's words about their natural places of refuge; but such implicitly
religious allusions have an independent appeal to any sensitive listener and tend to
be preferable, in the public discourse of a legislature in a liberal democracy, to an
overt appeal to a divine command that we be stewards of the earth. And if that
command is cited by a defender of the environment, it may be welcomed by"
nonbelievers as an honest statement of conviction when it is combined with secular
arguments, but felt to be a sectarian ground they cannot share if offered as the sole
reason for an environmental protection.
One further case should be mentioned here: that of advocacy. A lobbyist, for
example, speaks for the represented group, and it is understood that such people are
representing a point of view. It may be religious or not; but if it is, one would not be
surprised if some ofthe relevant discourse is religious. Religious discourse might not
be the most persuasive mode of advocacy in a liberal democracy, but that is a
contingent matter which is beside the point More generally, someone acting as a
representative advocate is morally freer regarding religious reasons (and indeed
other sorts of reasons) than ordinary citizens advocating something on their own.
Nonetheless, other things equal-as where persuasion for the cause in question is
equally effective-the principles so far proposed seem to apply.
IV. NONPUBLIC DISCOURSE: PRIVATE,
ECCLESIASTICAL, INSTITUTIONAL

My main concern so far has been public sociopolitical discourse. But inasmuch as
there is ample moral reason for citizens in a liberal democracy to avoid polarization
and, more positively, to enhance communication and to create a good climate for
peaceful coexistence, the principles proposed may be adapted to private discourse as
well.
Our homes are supposed to be our castles, and we tend to speak as we like in them.
Civility, however, is avirtue applicable farbeyond the public square. It is an element
in civic virtue that operates even in private settings. Depending on the make-up of
the conversational group in a home or other private setting, one may want to mix
religious and secular discourse, conduct discussion mainly in one or the other mode,
or shift from one to the other. Freedom is perhaps at its most extensive here; but the
general principle of respect for others operates here as elsewhere and may indicate
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one direction or another for the style and content of one's discourse on sociopolitical
matters. Spouses speaking to each other alone is one case; parents speaking to
children is another; conversing with guests is still another. Liberal democracies are
unlikely to survive unless patterns established in the home support civic virtue in
public. Morality-and especially the moral principles needed for a free
democracy-is highly permissive about private conduct; but if, as I maintain, it
reaches beyond overt behavior to the level of motivation, it certainly reaches into
private conduct. If, as Jesus taught, to look at another lustfully is already to sin in
one's own heart, perhaps we can also do wrong in our hearts by harboring certain
kinds of dispositions toward conversion of others, such as a tendency toward a kind
of manipulative conversion that we would not like someone else to use on us.
Private institutional contexts are also realms of more extensive freedom than is
appropriate to public discourse. It is clear that in a church setting religious discourse
may be appropriately dominant; but even there, mixed discourse might at times be
more effective. This is in part because the interplay of religious and secular
considerations regarding major aspects of sociopolitical life is often very fruitful in
reaching positions that are at best more difficult to arrive at from either point ofview
by itself. Consider medical care, where the love and compassion stressed by
Christianity can temper the relatively austere demands of the contractual relations
and the legal requirements that so pervasively affect medical practice. There is,
however, a two-way street here: some patients, even if they are theists and
voluntarily receiving treatment in a religiously affiliated hospital, need to be
addressed in secular language; and even for those who do not, religiously inspired
compassion can sometimes be best directed by secular discussion of psychological
matters.
Other kinds of religious institutions may be quite different from hospitals in the
discourse appropriate to their activities. Consider churches. As with other religious
institutions, the difference between what we might call internalquestions, such as
how the church is to be governed, and external questions, such as what the church
should do to relieve famine abroad, may affect what kind of language is appropriate
in policy discussions. Predominantly religious language is appropriate in decisions
about self-government. An effort to achieve theo-ethical equilibrium may still be of
value, however; and given how important church government and community
projects can be as training for citizenship in a democracy, there may be external as
well as internal reasons for churches to seek the widest kind of discourse, and the
broadest evidence base, consonant with their religious ideals.' Consider also a
church-affiliated university. Here again there is no need for any general separation
of religious and other considerations in the internal discourse of the institution, but
the needs of an educational mission may still be a constraint affecting what

32. For a discussion ofthe importance ofreligious institutions for democracy, see JohnA.
Coleman,DeprivingReligionandRevitalizingCitizenship,inREL.GIONAND CONThPORARY
LmERAiSM 264 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997); David Hollenbach, Politically Active
Churches: Some Empirical Prolegomena to a Normative Approach, in RELGION AND
CONTEMPORARY LiBERALISM, supra, at 291; Paul J. Weithman, Introduction:Religion and
the Liberalism ofReasonedRespect, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LBERALISM, supra,
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constitutes a good mixture of the two kinds of considerations. Balance in presenting
alternative positions, including secular ones, is surely required, especially in the
classroom, but mixed discourse in the classroom would be normal in a way it would
not be in secular institutions of learning.
Nonreligious institutions are quite different on this score. Secular universities,
especially if publicly funded, should observe the requirements of a reasonable
separation of church and state, and this imposes constraints on the content of their
discourse. There is still a place, however, for many kinds of mixed, secondary, and
self-identificational religious discourse. And in the course of advocacy, as where a
teacher takes on the role of defending natural theology or of sympathetically
explaining a religious position, predominantly mixed religious discourse may be
used. There is more freedom in this regard in proportion to the extent to which
comparably serious advocacy ofcompeting positions is offered to the same audience.
One-sidedness in a stretch of educational discourse may be balanced by onesidedness on an adjoining and contrasting stretch. It may in some cases even be
desirable to present competing positions in the vivid and forceful way this makes
possi'ble. One of the problems that educators face in practice is how large a segment
of discourse constitutes a domain for which appropriate balance should be achieved.
Without a certain amount ofunmixed sympathetic exposition, some views cannot be
easily communicated; left too long without analysis or criticism, some views may be
damaging to some audiences.
Journalistic institutions bear special mention here. Their influence on the general
public is immense. In my view, they, like universities, should aim at good
institutionalcitizenship. This implies adhering, at least in their public conduct and
discourse, to versions of the principles of secular rationale and motivation. A
religious television station, for instance, although at least its private discourse may
be of a largely unmixed religious character, should still, as institutional citizen,
adhere to those principles. Indeed, a free democracy is best served, I think, if,
however moral churches and other religious institutions are, they and their
journalistic organs are not political. They themselves may be best served under this
standard: it facilitates cooperation rather than competition with other religions and
denominations; it reduces the dilution of spiritual function that easily comes of a
concern with politics; and it renders less likely a political or even religious
domination of any 'minority religious community by a majority--or more
powerful-religious group.33

33. For a defense of a political neutral purpose, see AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supranote
4, at 6-8. This is an appropriate place to note that in some contexts of public discourse,
including some that are moral and some that are aesthetic, religious considerations may be
brought forward in an argumentative way that is not political. Some of what Michael Perry
takes to be a kind of testing of religious or religiously grounded views might fit this
description.
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CONCLUSION
If individuality flourishes in an atmosphere of free expression, there will be a
multitude of kinds of discourse and myriad mixtures ofthe religious and the secular.
In public discourse on sociopolitical matters, however, there are distinctions we
should make and standards we should maintain. If as citizens we determine ourvotes
and other political conduct for the right sorts of reasons, this is likely to show in our
modes of speech. We should try to cultivate a civic voice that reflects respect for
others of differing views and a commitment to certain shared-or at least
sharable-standards that are not dependent on any religions commitments or points
of view. It may be a mixed voice, but some mixtures are better than others. The kind
of issue in question, our role as citizen or government official, and our audience
largely determine what constitutes a good mixture of religions and secular language
for public sociopolitical discourse.
In public discourse, as in private life, it is difficult to overstress the importance of
being a good role model. This applies to some degree to institutions as well as to
individuals. It is of the first importance for an ethics of virtue as distinct from an
ethics of rights. Exemplifying virtue can be far more influential than preaching it
Many people too easily think that coercive laws may solve a problem, or that good
conduct can be legislated. But outstanding examples of adherence to a standard can
often win converts far better than its attempted enforcement. Persuasion is preferable
to coercion; and even where the motivation for a view is religions, persuasion may
workbest when secular reasons that any rational person can appreciate are forcefully
expressed in mainly nonreligious language. Quite apart from the discourse in which
an ideal is expressed, nothing persuades like its embodiment.

